The paper examines a dynamic model of a financial market with endogenous asset prices determined by short run equilibrium of supply and demand. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and partially reinvested. The traders use fixed-mix investment strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between assets in fixed proportions. Our main goal is to identify globally evolutionarily stable strategies, allowing an investor to "survive," i.e. to accumulate in the long run a positive share of market wealth, regardless of the initial state of the market. It is shown that there is a unique portfolio rule with this property-an analogue of the famous Kelly (1956) rule of "betting one's beliefs." A game theoretic interpretation of this result is given.
1 Introduction 1.1. Evolutionary finance. Price changes and dividend payments of stocks induce wealth dynamics among investors using different investment strategies (portfolio rules) in financial markets. These dynamics act as a natural selection force among the portfolio rules: some prove to be successful and "survive," the others fail and "become extinct." The purpose of the present paper is to investigate financial dynamics from this evolutionary perspective with the view to identifying evolutionarily stable (surviving) investment strategies.
Evolutionary ideas have a long history in the social sciences going back to Malthus, who played an inspirational role for Darwin (for a review of the subject see, e.g., Hodgeson [20] ). A more recent stage of development of these ideas began in the 1950s with the publications of Alchian [2] , Penrose [32] and others. A powerful momentum to work in this area was given by the interdisciplinary research conducted in the 1980s and 1990s under the auspices of the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico, USA, where researchers of different backgrounds-economists, mathematicians, physicists and biologistscombined their efforts to study evolutionary dynamics in biology, economics and finance; see, e.g., Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer and Taylor [5] , Farmer and Lo [16] , LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer [24] , Blume and Easley [7] , and Blume and Durlauf [6] .
Questions of survival and extinction of portfolio rules have been studied by Blume and Easley [7, 8] and Sandroni [35] in general equilibrium models with perfect foresight (e.g. Laffont [23] , Ch. 6), where agents maximize discounted sums of expected utilities. The selection results in their papers are driven by the interplay between an agent's consumption and the accuracy of his subjective beliefs (i.e. the individual assessment of the probabilities of future states). Most of the positive results in that line of research pertain to the case where the markets under consideration are complete.
The approach to evolutionary finance pursued here marks a departure from the conventional general equilibrium paradigm. In the model we deal with, the asset market dynamics are determined by the dynamic interaction of strategies of the traders, rather than by the maximization of utilities of consumption. These strategies are taken as fundamental characteristics of the agents, while the optimality of individual behavior and the coordination of beliefs (or the lack of it) are not reflected in formal terms but are rather left to the interpretation of the observed behavior. A specific feature of this approach is that it rests only on model components that are observable and can be estimated empirically, which makes the theory closer to practical applications. Our modeling framework based on random dynamical systems is substantially new, but one can trace its connections to some classical ideas in economics (we revive in the new context the Marshallian [28] concept of temporary equilibrium-see the discussion in Section 2). Although one does not require notions of rationality to define the dynamics, the main result has a game theoretic interpretation (Theorem 2), which links this study to the theory of market games-Shapley and Shubik [37] and others.
1.2. Outline of the model and the results. The model we propose describes the dynamics of a financial market in which there are I investors (traders) and K traded assets (securities). Asset supply is constant over time. Each trader chooses a strategy prescribing to distribute, at the beginning of each time period t = 1, 2, ..., his/her investment budget between the securities according to given proportions. Assets pay dividends, that are random and depend on a discrete-time stochastic process of exogenous "states of the world."
The prices of the securities at each date are derived endogenously from the equilibrium condition: aggregate market demand of each asset is equal to its supply. Each investor's individual demand depends on his/her budget and investment proportions. The main results pertain to the case where these proportions are fixed (constant over time). The budget of each investor depends on time and random factors. It has two sources: the dividends paid by the assets and capital gains. These two sources form investor's wealth, which is partially consumed and partially reinvested at each time period. When analyzing the long-run performance of trading strategies, we assume that the investment/consumption ratio is fixed and that it is the same for all the traders.
We note that the class of fixed-mix, or constant proportions, strategies we consider in this work is quite common in financial theory and practice; see, e.g., Perold and Sharpe [33] , Mulvey and Ziemba [29] , Browne [10] and Dempster [12, 13] . From the theoretical standpoint, this class of strategies provides a convenient laboratory for the analysis of questions we are interested in. It makes it possible to formalize in a clear and compact way the concept of the type of an investor which determines the evolutionary performance of his/her portfolio rule in the long run. A similar approach is common in evolutionary game theory (e.g. Weibull [40] ), and in this paper we initiate the analysis of our model by pursuing it in the context of an asset market dynamics.
The strategy profile of the investors determines the "ecology" of the market and its random dynamics over time. In the evolutionary perspective, survival or extinction of investment strategies is governed by the long-run behavior of the relative wealth of the investors, which depends on the combination of the strategies chosen. A portfolio rule (or an investor using it) is said to survive if it accumulates in the limit a positive fraction of total market wealth. It is said to become extinct if the share of market wealth corresponding to it tends to zero.
An investment strategy, or a portfolio rule, is called evolutionarily stable if the following condition holds. If a group of investors uses this rule, while all the others use different ones, those and only those investors survive who belong to the former group. If this condition holds regardless of the initial state of the market, the investment strategy is called globally evolutionarily stable. If it holds under the additional assumption that the group of investors using other portfolio rules (distinct from the one we consider) possesses a sufficiently small initial share of market wealth, then the above property of stability is termed local.
We prove that among all fixed-mix (i.e. constant proportions) investment strategies, the only globally evolutionarily stable portfolio rule is to invest according to the proportions of the expected dividends. This recipe is similar to the well-known Kelly's principle of "betting one's beliefs." The present paper contributes to that field of studies which originated from the pioneering work of Shannon 1 and Kelly [22] -see Breiman [9] , Thorp [39] , Algoet and Cover [3] , Hakansson and Ziemba [18] and references therein. Most of the previous work was concerned with models where asset prices were given exogenously, or where the analysis was based on a reduction to such models [7] . Our aim is to obtain analogous results in a dynamic equilibrium setting, with endogenous prices. Intermediate steps towards this aim were made in the previous papers [4] and [14] . Those papers dealt with a special case of "short-lived" assets. Here, we extend the results to a model with long-lived, dividend-paying assets and thus achieve the long-sought goal of providing a natural and general framework for this class of results.
1.3. Plan of the paper. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a rigorous description of the model, a brief outline of which was given above. In Section 3, we formulate and discuss the main results. Section 4 develops methods needed for the analysis of the model under consideration. The Appendix contains proofs of the technical results stated in Section 4.
2 The model 2.1. Equilibrium dynamics of an asset market. In the model we deal with, there are I ≥ 2 investors (traders) acting in a market where K ≥ 2 risky assets are traded. The situation on the market at date t = 0, 1, ... is characterized by the set of vectors
where p t ∈ R K + is the vector of market prices of the assets and
+ is the portfolio of investor i. For each k = 1, ..., K, the coordinate p t,k of the vector p t = (p t,1 , ..., p t,K ) stands for the price of one unit of asset k at date t. The coordinate x i t,k of the vector
indicates the amount of ("physical units" of) asset k in the portfolio x i t . The scalar product p t , x 
If the investor possessed the portfolio x i t−1 at date t − 1 ("yesterday"), then he/she will be willing to purchase the portfolio x i t = X i t (p t , x i t−1 ) at date t ("today"), provided that today's asset price system is p t . All the coordinates of X i t (p t , x i t−1 ) are non-negative: borrowing and short sales are ruled out. Define the aggregate demand function for the market under consideration as
where
is the set of portfolios of all the investors. It is supposed that the supply of each asset in each time period is constant and, for simplicity, normalized to 1. We examine the equilibrium market dynamics, assuming that, in each time period, the demand on each asset is equal to its supply:
By using the notation (1) and e := (1, 1, ..., 1), the previous system of equations can be written in the vector form:
Each solution to this system, p t , is an equilibrium price vector. It will follow from the assumptions we are going to impose that this vector exists, is unique and is strictly positive for each x t−1 satisfying
Equations (2) and
define a dynamical system describing the evolution of the asset market. The state of this dynamical system at time t = 1, 2, ... is a pair (p t , x t ), where
is a collection of investors' portfolios satisfying
t = e and p t is a non-negative K-dimensional vector whose coordinates are the equilibrium asset prices prevailing at date t. For date 0, the set of initial endowments (initial portfolios)
The knowledge of the state x t−1 at time t − 1 allows us to compute the equilibrium price vector p t at time t as the solution to equation (2) . Based on p t and x t−1 , we can determine x t = (x 1 t , ..., x I t ) from (4) . By iterating this procedure, we can generate a path
of the dynamical system in question.
In the model considered here, the demand functions X i t (·, ·) of investors depend on random factors (via random asset dividends). Therefore paths (5) are random processes, and so we will deal with a random dynamical system. We are interested, in particular, in the long-run behavior (as t → ∞) of paths of this system in connection with questions of evolutionary market dynamics.
2.2. Investors' budgets and demand functions. In the model under consideration, investor i's budget at date t, on which his/her demand depends, is given by
There are two sources from which the budget is formed: the value p t , x i t−1 of yesterday's portfolio x i t−1 , expressed in terms of the current prices p t , and the dividend
yielded by the portfolio x i t−1 . It is supposed that (one unit of) asset k pays the dividend d t,k ≥ 0 at date t ≥ 1. The dividends depend on random factors as described below.
Randomness is modeled as follows. There is a finite set S and a sequence s 0 , s 1 , ... of random variables with values in S. The random parameter s t characterizes the state of the world at date t. The dividends d t,k of the assets k = 1, ..., K are supposed to be functions of the history s t := (s 0 , ..., s t ) of states of the world prior to date t:
We impose the following fundamental assumptions regarding d t,k (·): (d1) for all s t , we have
The first assumption means that always at least one asset pays a strictly positive dividend. According to the second condition, for each asset k the probability that it pays a strictly positive dividend is strictly positive.
We assume that the individual demand function of investor i is of the form
where µ i t,1 , ..., µ i t,K are nonnegative numbers satisfying
According to (6) and (7), the trader acts in the market as follows. He/she gets the dividends d t , x i t−1 from the portfolio x i t−1 and rebalances the portfolio (by selling some assets and buying others) at the prices p t so that the new portfolio If p t,k = 0, then the expression on the right-hand side of (7) is not defined, and in this case we put X i t,k (p t , x i t−1 ) = 0. We define the price p t,k of asset k as zero if this asset is not traded; in this case, the holdings of this asset in the portfolio of each investor are zero, i.e. X i t,k (p t , x i t−1 ) = 0. This possibility, however, will be excluded by the assumptions we are going to impose. Under these assumptions all the equilibrium asset prices will be strictly positive.
According to (8) , the sum µ i t,1 + ... + µ i t,K is strictly less than one. This means that not all of the investor's budget is used for purchasing assets. Some fraction of the budget is used for consumption. This fraction,
is the investor i's consumption rate. 
satisfying (8) for all t and all realizations of the states of the world. As long as the vectors
.., depend on s t , the demand functions (7) also depend on s t , and so the state (p t , x t ) of the random dynamical system under consideration is a function of the history s t of the states of the world from time zero to time t. If a strategy profile (µ t (s t ))
The vector p t = p t (s t ) ∈ R K + satisfying (10) exists and is unique. This follows from the fact that, for each s t and each vector
is contracting in the norm |p| := k |p k |. Indeed,
The unique price vector p t ≥ 0 satisfying (10) is strictly positive if one of the following conditions holds: 
The validity of at least one of conditions (I) or (II) is essentially necessary for the dynamical system in question to be non-degenerate in the following sense. If neither condition is supposed to hold, then it might happen that p t,k = 0 for some t and k. Indeed, denote by e i the vector whose coordinates are equal to 0 except the ith coordinate which is equal to 1 and put
Throughout the paper, we are going to deal with a model in which condition (I) holds; condition (II) is provided here only for the sake of completeness.
2.4. Market evolution and Marshallian temporary equilibrium. In the model we deal with, the dynamics of an asset market is modeled in terms of a sequence of temporary equilibria. At each date t the investors' strategies µ i t,k , the asset dividends d t,k and the portfolios x play the role of initial endowments available at the beginning of date t. The portfolios x i t constructed according to (11) are transferred to date t + 1 and then in turn serve as initial endowments for the investors.
The dynamics of the asset market described above are similar to the dynamics of the commodity market as outlined in the classical treatise by Alfred Marshall [28] (Book V, Chapter II "Temporary Equilibrium of Demand and Supply"). Marshall's ideas were introduced into formal economics by Samuelson [34] , pp. 321-323. Equations analogous to (10) , (11) were derived in continuous time by Lotka [26] ; they became the classics of mathematical evolutionary biology. In rigorous terms, the Marshallian concept of temporary equilibrium, as it is understood in the present work, was in much detail analyzed in an economics context by Schlicht [36] . The equations on pp. 29-30 in the monograph [36] are direct continuous-time, deterministic counterparts of our equations (10) and (11). They underlie the Marshallian temporary equilibrium approach.
As it was noticed by Samuelson [34] and emphasized by Schlicht [36] , in order to study the process of market dynamics by using the Marshallian "moving equilibrium method," one needs to distinguish between at least two sets of economic variables changing with different speeds. Then the set of variables changing slower (in our case, the set x t = (x 1 t , ...., x I t ) of investors' portfolios) can be temporarily fixed, while the other (in our case, the asset prices p t ) can be assumed to rapidly reach the unique state of partial equilibrium. Samuelson [34] writes about this approach:
I, myself, find it convenient to visualize equilibrium processes of quite different speed, some very slow compared to others. Within each long run there is a shorter run, and within each shorter run there is a still shorter run, and so forth in an infinite regression. For analytic purposes it is often convenient to treat slow processes as data and concentrate upon the processes of interest. For example, in a short run study of the level of investment, income, and employment, it is often convenient to assume that the stock of capital is perfectly or sensibly fixed.
As it follows from the above citation, Samuelson thinks about a hierarchy of various equilibrium processes with different speeds. In our model, it is sufficient to deal with only two levels of such a hierarchy. We leave the price adjustment process leading to the solution of the partial equilibrium problem (10) beyond the scope of the model. It can be shown, however, that this equilibrium will be reached at an exponential rate in the course of any naturally defined tâtonnement procedure (cf. (12) and (13)). Results yielding a rigorous justification of the above approach, involving "rapid" and "slow" variables, are provided in continuous time by the theory of singular perturbations-e.g. Smith [38] .
The concept of a temporary, or moving, equilibrium was introduced and analyzed apparently for the first time by Marshall. However, in the last four decades this term has been by and large associated with a different notion, going back to Lindahl [25] and Hicks [19] . This notion was developed in formal settings by Grandmont and others (see, e.g., the volume [17] ). The characteristic feature of the Lindahl-Hicks temporary equilibrium is the idea of forecasts or beliefs about the future states of the world, which all the market participants possess and which are formalized in terms of stochastic kernels (transition functions) conditioning the distributions of future states of the world upon the agents' private information. A discussion of the modern state of this direction of research is provided by Magill and Quinzii [27] .
In this work, we pursue a completely different approach. Our model might indirectly take into account agents' forecasts or beliefs, but they can be only implicitly incorporated into the agents' investment strategies. These strategies are the only agents' characteristics we rely upon in our modeling. Such characteristics can be observed and estimated based on the real market data, and we formulate our results in the form of recommendations for an investor what strategies to follow.
To distinguish the above approach to temporary equilibrium from the one based on the Hicks-Lindahl concepts, we suggest the terms "Marshallian" or "evolutionary temporary equilibrium." The former term is motivated by the already cited Marshall's [28] ideas. The latter is justified not only by the main focus of the model on questions of survival and extinction of portfolio rules, but also by deep analogies between the dynamic processes governed by the evolutionary equations (10), (11) and similarly described processes in evolving complex systems in physics, mechanics, chemical kinetics, evolutionary biology, ecology and other sciences-see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund [21] . 3 The main results 3.1. Dynamics of market shares. Our further analysis will be based on the following assumptions:
(i) the states of the world s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , ... form a sequence of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) elements in S such that the probability P {s t = s} is strictly positive for each s ∈ S;
(ii) the asset dividends d t,k (s t ) are functions of the current state s t of the world:
where the functions D k (s) ( s ∈ S, k = 1, 2, ..., K) do not depend on t, are non-negative and satisfy
Each investor i chooses an investment strategy (portfolio rule) characterized by a fixed non-negative vector
The numbers µ i k indicate the fractions of investor i's budget according to which he/she distributes wealth between the assets k = 1, ..., K. These fractions remain the same over time, so that we deal here with simple, or fixed-mix, investment strategies. In the remainder of the paper we will consider only those portfolio rules (µ i 1 , ..., µ i K ) which are completely mixed, i.e., µ i k > 0 for each k = 1, ...K. Furthermore, we will assume that the consumption rate µ
k is the same for all the investors and it is equal to 1 − ρ, where ρ is some given number in (0, 1). We suppose that the consumption rate is the same for all the market traders because we are mainly interested in comparing the long-run performance of investment strategies. This can be done only for a group of traders having the same consumption rate. Otherwise, a seemingly lower performance of a strategy may be simply due to a higher consumption rate of the investor.
As long as the sum K k=1 µ i k does not depend on i and is equal to some given number ρ ∈ (0, 1), it is convenient to characterise the investment decisions of each investor i in terms of the vector of investment proportions
The numbers λ . From now on, we will associate the terms "investment strategy" or "portfolio rule" with such vectors of investment proportions.
If each investor i = 1, ..., I selects a portfolio rule
+ , the strategy profile (λ 1 , ..., λ I ) determines, in accordance with equations
equivalent to (10) and (11) 
From (14) we get 
By summing up these equations over i = 1, ..., I, we obtain
This leads to the formula
is the sum of the dividends of all the assets. Dividing both sides of equation (17) by W t+1 and using formula (18), we find
Thus we arrive at the system of equations:
are the relative dividends of the assets k = 1, ..., K. Let ∆ I denote the set of vectors r = (r 1 , ..., r I ) ≥ 0 whose norm |r| := |r i | is equal to one. It can be shown (see Section 4 below) that, for any r t = (r 1 t , ..., r I t ) ∈ ∆ I and any s t+1 ∈ S, the system of equations (20) has a unique solution r t+1 ≥ 0. We have r t+1 ∈ ∆ I , which can be verified by summing up equations (20) and using the fact that
We will denote the solution r t+1 to system (20) (as a function of s t+1 and r t ) by F (s t+1 , r t ). The mapping F (s t+1 , ·) transforms ∆ I into ∆ I . Thus we deal here with a random dynamical system
on the unit simplex ∆ I . We will assume that a strictly positive non-random vector r 0 ∈ ∆ I is fixed. Starting from this initial state, we can generate a path (trajectory) r 0 , r 1 (s 1 ), r 2 (s 2 ), ... of the random system (21) according to the formula r t+1 (s t+1 ) = F (s t+1 , r t (s t )), t = 0, 1, ..., (If t = 0, we formally write r 0 = r 0 (s 0 ) having in mind that r 0 is a constant.) Remark. The model for the dynamics of investors' market shares we have described above was proposed in [15] . Its presentation in this paper is slightly different from that in [15] . (In particular, we here write ρ in place of 1 − λ 0 and λ [15] .) In the limit as ρ → 0, the model reduces to the one studied in [14] . In particular, if ρ = 0, the random dynamical system described by equations (20) coincides with that examined in [14] .
3.2. Survival and extinction of portfolio rules. We examine the dynamics of the relative wealth r i t , governed by equations (20) , from an evolutionary perspective. We are interested in questions of "survival and extinction" of portfolio rules. We say that a portfolio rule λ i = (λ i 1 , ..., λ i K ) (or investor i using it) survives with probability one in the market selection process (20) 
central role in this work is played by the following definition.
Def inition 1 A portfolio rule λ = (λ 1 , ..., λ K ) is called globally evolutionarily stable if the following condition holds. Suppose, in a group of investors i = 1, 2, ..., J (1 ≤ J < I), all use the portfolio rule λ, while all the others, i = J + 1, ..., I use portfolio rulesλ i distinct from λ. Then those investors who belong to the former group (i = 1, ..., J) survive with probability one, whereas those who belong to the latter (i = J + 1, ..., I) become extinct with probability one.
In the above definition, it is supposed that the initial state r 0 in the market selection process governed by equations (20) is any strictly positive vector r 0 ∈ ∆ I . This is reflected in the term "global evolutionary stability." An analogous local concept (cf. [15] ) is defined similarly, but in the definition of local evolutionary stability, the initial market share r J+1 0 + ... + r I 0 of the group of investors who use strategiesλ i distinct from λ is supposed to be small enough.
Our main goal is to identify that portfolio rule which is globally evolutionarily stable. Clearly, if it exists it must be unique. Indeed if there are two such rules, λ = λ , we can divide the population of investors into two groups assuming that the first uses λ and the second λ . Then, according to the definition of global evolutionary stability, both groups must become extinct with probability one, which is impossible since the sum of the relative wealth of all the investors is equal to one.
3.3. Central result. Define
so that λ * 1 , ..., λ * K are the expected relative dividends of assets k = 1, ..., K. The portfolio rule (investment strategy) λ * is called the Kelly portfolio rule. It prescribes to invest in accordance with the principle of "betting one's beliefs," as formulated in the pioneering paper by Kelly [22] , for further studies in this direction see Breiman [9] , Thorp [39] , Algoet and Cover [3] and Hakansson and Ziemba [18] .
Recall that, according to a convention made in Section 2, we consider in this paper only completely mixed portfolio rules. Therefore the vectors λ andλ i involved in Definition 1 are supposed to be strictly positive. The Kelly rule is completely mixed by virtue of assumptions (D1) and (D2).
Throughout the paper, we will assume that the functions R 1 (s), ..., R K (s) are linearly independent (there are no redundant assets).
The main result of this paper is as follows.
Theorem 1 The Kelly rule is globally evolutionarily stable.
In order to prove this theorem we have to consider a group of investors i = 1, ..., J using the portfolio rule λ * , assume that all the other investors i = J +1, ..., I use portfolio rules λ i = λ * and show that the former group survives, while the latter becomes extinct. In general, J should be any number between 1 ≤ J < I. We note, however, that it is sufficient to prove the theorem assuming that J = 1, in which case the result reduces to the assertion that r 1 t → 1 almost surely. To perform the reduction of the case J > 1 to the case J = 1, we "aggregate" the group of investors i = 1, 2, ..., J into one by settingr 
where λ k , r = λ * kr
Thus the original model reduces to the analogous one in which there are I − J + 1 investors (i = 1, J + 1, ..., I) so that investor 1 uses the Kelly strategy λ * and all the others, i = J + 1, ..., I, use strategies distinct from λ * . If we have proved Theorem 1 in the special case J = 1, we know that r i t → 0 almost surely for all i = J + 1, ..., I. Consequently,r 1 t → 1, which means that the group of investors i = 1, ..., I (which we treat as a single, "aggregate," investor) accumulates in the limit all market wealth. It remains to observe that in the original model, the proportions between the relative wealth of investors i, j who belong to the group 1, ..., J using the Kelly rule do not change in time. This is so because for all such investors, the growth rates of their relative wealth are the same:
Consequently, 
we obtain that r
) for all i = 1, ..., J, which means that all the "Kelly investors" i = 1, ..., J survive.
Thus in order to prove Theorem 1 it is sufficient to establish the following fact: if investor 1 uses the Kelly rule, while all the others use strategies distinct from the Kelly rule, investor 1 is almost surely the single survivor in the market selection process. We will prove this assertion in Section 4 based on a number of auxiliary results. These results provide methods needed for the analysis of the model at hand, and some of them are of independent interest.
3.4. Random asset market game. We would like to discuss our main result from a game-theoretic point of view. Consider a non-cooperative game with I players (investors), whose strategies are completely mixed simple portfolio rules λ i ∈ ∆ . These data define a non-cooperative game with random payoffs, which we will call the random asset market game. Consider the strategy profile Λ * := (λ * 1 , ..., λ * I ) for which λ * i := λ * (the Kelly strategy profile).
Theorem 2 The Kelly strategy profile forms with probability one a symmetric dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in the random asset market game.
The assertion of the theorem means that if one of the players i, say player i = 1, employs the strategy λ * and all the other players use any strategies λ 2 , ..., λ A static (one-period) version of the above game in which the payoff functions were defined in terms of expected payoffs was considered in the paper by Alós-Ferrer and Ania [1] . That paper dealt with a model involving short lived assets (the case ρ = 0). The definition of the game in [1] does not involve the asymptotic performance of investment strategies in the long run, and in this connection, the results in [1] are different from ours.
4 Techniques for the analysis of evolutionary market dynamics 4.1. The mapping defining the random dynamical system. In this section we develop methods needed for the study of the model under consideration. We here provide only the statements and discussions of the results; their proofs are relegated to the Appendix. We begin with the analysis of the mapping defining the random dynamical system (20) . Let ρ be a number satisfying 0 ≤ ρ < 1. For each s ∈ S, consider the mapping F (s, r) = (F 1 (s, r), ..., F I (s, r)) of the unit simplex ∆ I into itself defined by
The fact that the mapping under consideration is well-defined is established in Proposition 1 below. Fix some element s of the state space S and a vector r = (r 1 , ..., r I ) ∈ ∆ I . Consider the affine operator B :
+ into the vector y = (y 1 , ..., y I ) ∈ R I + defined by
where R k = R k (s).
Proposition 1 The operator B possesses a unique fixed point in R I
+ . This point belongs to the unit simplex ∆ I .
Proposition 2 We have
It follows from (23) and the inequalities
is continuous in r ∈ ∆ I . For each s ∈ S and r = (r 1 , ..., r I ) ∈ ∆ I , define
It follows from (22) that if r i > 0, then
so that g i (s, r) is the growth rate of the ith coordinate under the mapping
The proposition below shows that the growth rate is uniformly bounded away from zero and infinity.
Proposition 3 For each r ∈ ∆ I and each i = 1, ..., I, we have
The function g i (s, r) is continuous in r ∈ ∆ I .
Return on the Kelly portfolio. Define
where λ * k = ER k (s), k = 1, ..., K. Suppose, at date t, the relative wealth of the investors i = 1, ..., I are given by the vector r = (r 1 , ..., r I ) ∈ ∆ I . Then the (relative) asset prices at dates t and t + 1 are
provided the state of the world realized at date t + 1 is s. An investor's portfolio in which unit wealth is distributed between the assets according to the proportions λ * k , k = 1, ..., K, is called the Kelly portfolio. The (gross) return on this portfolio, taking into account the dividends and consumption, is given by the function f (s, r) defined by (26) , which can be written as
If one of the investors i = 1, ..., I, say investor 1, employs the investment strategy λ
, then the growth rate of his/her market share is equal to f (s, r):
(see (24) and (26)). An important result on which the analysis of the model at hand is based is contained in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For each r ∈ ∆ I , we have
This inequality is strict if and only if
This result means that the expected logarithmic return on the Kelly portfolio (λ * 1 , ..., λ * K ) is non-negative. It is strictly positive if and only if (λ * 1 , ..., λ * K ) does not coincide with the market portfolio (p 1 , ..., p K ). Recall that the total amount of each asset is normalized to 1, so that the total wealth invested into asset k is p k = λ k , r . We emphasize that, in Theorem 3, it is not assumed that any of the investors i = 1, ..., I uses the Kelly strategy. The result is applicable without this assumption. 
hold? Recall that we denote by p k the price of the asset k corresponding to the vector r = (r 1 , ..., r I ) of relative wealth at some fixed moment of time,
and by q k (s) the price of the asset at the next moment of time, when the state of the world realized is s:
The question we formulated is important for the analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the relative wealth of an investor using the Kelly rule. As Proposition 4 below shows, the answer to this question (under the assumptions we impose) is negative.
Recall that we assume that there are no redundant assets, i.e., the functions R 1 (s), ..., R K (s) are linearly independent. This assumption will be used in the following proposition. are well-defined and finite. Clearly, they have finite expectations because each of them takes on a finite number of values (since the set S is finite). Suppose investor 1 uses the Kelly rule
Consider the growth rate r 
(see (24)), and since the strategy λ 1 of investor 1 coincides with the Kelly rule λ * , we have r 1 t+1
where f (s, r) is the function defined by (26) . Denote by ξ t = ξ t (s t ) the logarithm of the relative wealth of investor 1,
where π(s) > 0 is the probability that s t+1 = s. The last two equalities in the above chain of relations follow from the fact that the random variables s 1 , s 2 , ... are independent and identically distributed. By virtue of Theorem 3, s∈S π(s) ln f (s, r t (s t )) ≥ 0, which proves (32). Since 0 < r 1 t ≤ 1, we have ξ t ≤ 0, and so ξ t , t = 0, 1, ..., is a non-positive submartingale. As is wellknown, a non-positive submartingale converges almost surely (a.s.) ξ t → ξ ∞ (a.s.) as t → ∞ (see, e.g., [31] , Section IV.5). This implies r 1 t = e ξt → e ξ∞ > 0 (a.s.). This leads to the following result.
Theorem 4
The relative wealth of a Kelly investor converges a.s., and the limit is strictly positive.
It follows from Theorem 4 that an investor using the Kelly strategy survives with probability one. A key result of this study is Theorem 5 below, asserting that if one of the investors uses the Kelly rule and all the others use other strategies, distinct from the Kelly one, then the Kelly investor is the only survivor in the market selection process. As has been noticed in 3.3, this result immediately implies Theorem 1. We note that if ρ = 0, Theorem 5 follows from the main result of the paper [14] . Methods developed in this work are different in some respects from those in [14] . Although they are applicable to a substantially more complex model, they do not give exponential estimates for the convergence of the relative wealth process.
The function g i (s, r) is continuous in r ∈ ∆ I , because F (s, r) is continuous in r and λ k , r ≥ µ * > 0 (see (24) ).
Proof of Theorem 3. 1st step. Multiplying both sides of (22) by λ i m and summing up over i = 1, ..., I, we get
(m = 1, ..., K). By using the notation introduced in (27) , equations (33) and inequality (28) can be written as
and
Condition (29) is necessary for this inequality to be strict (the "only if" part in (29)) because p k = λ * k for all k = 1, ..., K implies that the left-hand side of (35) is zero.
2nd step. We fix the argument s and omit it in the notation. Consider the
Then (for the fixed s) the system of equations (34) can be written
[q = q(s)]. Indeed, the mth coordinate (Aq − b) m of the vector Aq − b can be expressed as follows
which is equal to the difference between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (34) . We can represent the matrix A as A = Id − ρC, where Id is the identity matrix and
The norm of the linear operator C is not greater than one, because
Consequently, the operator ρC is contracting, and so each of the equivalent equations Aq = 0 and q = ρCq has a unique solution. Thus the matrix A is nondegenerate, and the solution to the linear system (37) can be represented as
Then we have
This expression appears in (35) , and our goal is to estimate the expected logarithm of it (when R k and q depend on s). To this end we write
where A denotes the conjugate matrix. In (42), we use the identity (A −1 ) = (A ) −1 , holding for each invertible linear operator A. By virtue of (42),
where l = (A ) −1 c, i.e., the vector l is the solution to the linear system A l = c. The matrix A is given by
and the linear system A l = c can be written
(see (40) ) or equivalently,
Further, in view of (40) and (36), we obtain
where the last equality follows from (44). Consequently,
(see (41) and (43)). 4th step. According to Step 1 of the proof, we have to establish inequality (35) for every solution q(s), s ∈ S, of system (34) and show that this inequality is strict if
The considerations presented in Steps 2 and 3, allow to reduce this problem to the following one: for the solution l = (l 1 , ..., l K ) to system (44), show that
(see (46) and (43)). Additionally, it has to be shown that the last inequality is strict if assumption (47) holds. The advantage of the new problem comparative to the original one lies in the fact that system (44), in contrast with (34), does not depend on s. We write (44) equivalently as
and, by changing variables
we transform (44) to
and the problem reduces to the following one: given the solution (f 1 , ..., f K ) to system (48), show that
with strict inequality if (p 1 , ..., p K ) = (λ * 1 , ..., λ * K ). Note that the affine operator defined by the right-hand side of (48) is contracting (see (38) and (39)) and leaves the non-negative cone R K + invariant. Therefore there exists a unique vector f = (f 1 , ..., f K ) solving (48). Furthermore, this vector is strictly positive (which follows from the strict positivity of λ * = (λ * 1 , ..., λ * K )) and satisfies K k=1 f k = 1. The last equality can be obtained by summing up equations (48) over k = 1, ..., K.
By virtue of Jensen's inequality, applied to the concave function ln(·), we have
(We use here the fact that K k=1 R k (s) = 1 for all s.) Thus it is sufficient to prove that if a vector (f 1 , ..., f K ) satisfies (48), then
and inequality (50) is strict when assumption (47) is fulfilled. This problem is purely deterministic: no random parameter s is involved either in (48) or in (50).
Let us multiply both sides of these equations by ln g k and sum up over k = 1, ..., K:
Indeed, then we have
which yields (52). In the above chain of relations, the last equality holds by virtue of (57).
To verify inequality (58) we write
Thus to prove (58) it remains to check that
for each i = 1, ..., I. Let us fix i and put λ k = λ i k . Inequality (59) can be written
where "E" stands for the weighted average
Observe that the function φ(g) = g ln g is strictly convex. Consequently,
and the inequality is strict if g k = g m for some k and m. Thus
where the former inequality in this chain of relations coincides with (60) and the latter is a consequence of the concavity of the function ln(·). Furthermore, both inequalities in (61) are strict provided that g k = g m for some k. If the last condition does not hold, then f k /p k = c for some constant c, which must necessarily be equal to one because
6th step. At the previous step of the proof, we established inequality (52) and hence (50). Moreover, the arguments conducted show that inequality (52) (and hence (50)) is strict if condition (55) is fulfilled. Indeed, if relation (56) holds then, under assumption (55), we have a strict inequality in (53), which implies a strict inequality in (52). Alternatively, if relation (57), opposite to (56), holds, then strict inequalities in (61) and (59) imply strict inequalities in (58) and (52).
Thus to complete the proof it suffices to show that if f k = p k , k = 1, 2, ..., K, then p k = λ * k , k = 1, 2, ..., K. Indeed, if f k = p k , then we have 
where λ * k = ER k (s),R k (s) = ρλ * k + (1 − ρ)R k (s). Observe that if there are no redundant assets, the relation 
We have 
Suppose condition (a) holds. Since
By virtue of (67), (68) and (69), there exists a realization (s 1 , ..., s t , ...) of the process of states of the world such that, for the sequence of vectors r t−1 = r t−1 (s t−1 ) ∈ ∆ I , we have 0 < lim r 
In the rest of the proof, we will fix such a realization (s 1 , ..., s t , ...) and write r t−1 in place of r t−1 (s t−1 ). Since the simplex ∆ I is compact, there exists a sequence t 1 < t 2 < ... and a vector r ∈ ∆ I such that r tn−1 → r ∈ ∆ I .
It follows from (70) and (72) that the first coordinate r 1 if the vector r = (r 1 , ..., r I ) satisfies 0 < r 1 < 1.
Relations (71) and (72) 
and σ∈S π(σ) ln f (σ, F (s, r)) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
According to Theorem 2, relation (75) can hold only if
and equations (76) imply λ k , F (s, r) = λ * k , k = 1, ..., K, s ∈ S.
By virtue of Proposition 4, relations (73), (77) and (78) cannot hold simultaneously. This is a contradiction.
In the proof of Theorem 5 we used the following fact.
Lemma. Let ξ t be a non-positive submartingale. Then the sequence of nonnegative random variables ζ t = E t−1 ξ t+1 − ξ t−1 converges to zero a.s.
Proof. We have ζ t ≥ 0 by the definition of a submartingale. Further, Eζ t = (Eξ t+1 − Eξ t )+ (Eξ t − Eξ t−1 ), and so Eζ t of the non-negative random variables ζ t converges, which implies (see, e.g., Corollary to Theorem 11, in Chapter VI in [30] ) that ζ t → 0 (a.s.).
